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Who Owns Ocean Biodiversity?:
The Legal Status and Role of
Patents as a Means to Achieve
Equitable Distribution of
Benefits
Abhaya Ganashree *
Abstract
The technological race to obtain genetic material from the ocean
floors has been led by the economically advanced states of the global
North. It has been a race for obtaining mineral resources among states,
dominated by Inter-State competition for land, people and money.
However, when the issue concerns mineral resources found in areas
beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), there is potential for either
competition or cooperation among nation-states. Deep-sea mining and
bioprospecting are particularly divisive. Very early on states recognised
that this might lead to political tensions among them and so agreed to
a standard that they would adhere to in their exploration and
exploitation of these resources. This led to the creation of the ‘Common
Heritage of Mankind’ principle. Although this agreement was reached
in reference to mineral resources, the regulation of marine genetic
resources (MGRs), particularly those mined from ABNJ, remains
ungoverned. However, with the increasing incidence of ocean
exploration, the use of these resources have exposed three gaps within
the global framework of access and benefit-sharing stemming from the
international law, biodiversity law and intellectual property
respectively.
Starting under the premise of the public domain, resources are
being appropriated under the absence of any applicable legal regime.
Chapter I attempts to answer the question who owns biodiversity by
identifying the regulatory gap within the Law of the Sea. Chapter II
addresses the regulatory gap under biodiversity law and identifies the
problem of inefficiency within the current benefit-sharing framework.
The question of whether the interlinking of the patent system and
biodiversity law would alleviate this inefficiency is considered and three
hindrances to such an argument are identified. Chapter III considers
academic, political and stakeholder opinion on these issues by taking
into account international and transnational law. This thorough
analysis indicated that patent law has thus far been unable to lead to
*

Abhaya is an LLM Candidate at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. She has an interest in public international law and
dispute resolution.
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an effective and efficient solution. This paper then takes into account
the existing political and stakeholder conflicts surrounding the
maximisation of economic value that have so far hindered the process
of reaching an efficient solution at the international arena. The author
proposes that the ‘nondominium’ principle could prove to be an
effective solution and potentially pave the way to incentivise user
countries to innovate without private appropriation of rights through
patents.
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Introduction
In 1962, a green fluorescent protein, derived from a bioluminescent
jellyfish, was found in the deep-sea. 1 Drawing inspiration from their
bright glow, in 2008, scientists won the Nobel Prize due to their
discovery that the protein could be used as a biological highlighter to
track the growth of cancerous cells. 2 The ability of marine genetic
resources (“MGRs”) to thrive in harsh conditions, for example in
hydrothermal vents, 3 has resulted in MGRs becoming indispensable for
use in the field of medicine and for future research developments. 4 This
is a momentous example of MGRs’ value found in the areas beyond
national jurisdiction (“ABNJ”), and is a testament that future is here
and must be regulated. Science has become more important than ever
for development, with the UNESCO Declaration on Science and the
Use of Scientific Knowledge acknowledging that this was even more so
for developing countries. 5 The pace of such unprecedented scientific
advancement has increased MGRs’ significance and has created the
need for equitable distribution of benefits arising from its derivatives.6
The bioprospecting process, defined as the “scientific investigation of
living organisms for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical
resources,” includes the research, collection and utilization of genetic
resources. 7 While exploiting genetic resources, signatories are obligated
to follow the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), 8 where they
have committed to the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising

1.

MARC ZIMMER, ILLUMINATING DISEASE: AN INTRODUCTION
FLUORESCENT PROTEINS 1 (2015).

2.

Id. at 15–17.

3.

Serge Beslier, The Protection and Sustainable Exploitation of Genetic
Resources of the High Seas from the European Union’s Perspective, 24
INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 333, 334 (2009).

4.

Angelica Bonfanti & Seline Trevisanut, TRIPS on the High Seas:
Intellectual Property Rights on Marine Genetic Resources, 37 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 187, 188 (2011).

5.

Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge, ¶ 34,
UNESCO (July 1, 1999),
http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/declaration_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/N7VV-2KAX].

6.

See Beslier, supra note 3, at 334, 336–39.

7.

JOANNA MOSSOP, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL
MILES 111 (2016).

8.

Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter CBD].
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out of the utilization of genetic resources.” 9 Although the ABNJ,
comprising of the high seas and the surrounding area, is open to all and
cannot be appropriated, 10 few countries have the economic resources
and technical capability to conduct bioprospecting to obtain these
resources. 11 However, most sampling is conducted in developing tropical
countries. 12 This has led to unequitable distribution, which—alongside
the emerging issues surrounding intellectual property protection offered
to such discoveries and inventions—has given rise to discussions in both
academic and international fora. 13 These discussions stem from the
regulatory gap of MGRs within the ABNJ left in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas (“UNCLOS”) and the 1994
Implementation Agreement. 14 Further, the Nagoya Protocol on Access
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from Their Utilization (“Nagoya Protocol”) 15 of the CBD failed
to acknowledge the similar necessity to regulate the access and benefitsharing of MGRs beyond national jurisdictions. 16 For more than a
decade the international community has expressed differing viewpoints
on this issue, 17 but the question remains: how do we close such gaps in
practice without hampering scientific research in the future?
Currently, MGRs are tested to treat chronic pain and asthma.18
They are also comprised of 11% of the gene bank, per a 2017 study.19
9.

Id. at art. 1.

10.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 136 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

11.

See Rachel Wynberg, Marine Genetic Resources and Bioprospecting in
the Western Indian Ocean, in REG’L STATE OF THE COAST REP. 407,
409 (José Paula ed., 2015).

12.

Id.

13.

See id. at 412.

14.

G.A. Res. 48/263, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 (Aug. 17, 1994).

15.

Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological
Diversity,
Oct.
29,
2010,
U.N.
Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].

16.

Beslier, supra note 3, at 337.

17.

Id. at 339–40.

18.

Kevin Krajick, Medicine from the Sea, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 30, 2004),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/medicine-from-thesea-99586066/ [https://perma.cc/C8AZ-69S8].

19.

Robert Blasiak et al., Corporate Control and Global Governance of
Marine Genetic Resources, 4 SCIENCE ADVANCES 1, 2 (2018).
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For the law to remain effective, it must respond to the growing
significance of MGRs and avoid remaining incomplete. 20 To address this
advancement, on June 19, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution to “develop an internationally legally binding
instrument” (“ILBI”) on UNCLOS to address biodiversity in areas
beyond its national jurisdiction. 21 However, a number of actors—states,
industrial stakeholders, and academics—influence the speed and
direction of such an evolutionary process. 22 The focus of this paper is
to identify the most efficient method to facilitate fair and equitable
distribution and thus reduce the gap between states of the Global North
and of the South.
The complex nature of this legal issue results from two regulatory
gaps in science and technology. The first is within the international law
of the sea, and the second is within biodiversity law.
UNCLOS splits the ocean into different maritime zones and
regulates the activities that can be conducted within these areas. 23 This
division of the maritime zones has resulted in MGRs’ ambiguous legal
status in the ABNJ and a disagreement on whether the ABNJ is subject
to the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind (“CHM”) or to
the freedom of the high seas. 24 Broadly, the CHM principle recognizes
that users must not appropriate the resources; the resources must
remain accessible to all, and the benefits must be shared equitably. 25
Alternatively, the freedom of the high seas envisages a free market
situation where property can be used for individual benefit and claimed
on a “first-come-first-served” basis. 26
The second is the efficiency of the ABS framework itself and the
granting of patents to these inventions. Recently, the workability of the
ABS framework in the light of technological advances came into
question. 27 Further, patents leading to exclusive rights have been
identified as a hindrance to equitable distribution and scientific
20.

See Wynberg, supra note 11, at 414.

21.

G.A. Res. 69/292, Development of an International Legally Binding
Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2015).

22.

See Beslier, supra note 3, at 338–39.

23.

See UNCLOS, supra note 10.

24.

Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 4.

25.

See generally E.D. Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus Common
Heritage of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO
L. R. 521 (1983).

26.

Id.

27.

MANUEL RUIZ MULLER, ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND
BENEFIT-SHARING 25 YEARS ON: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 2 (2018).
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advancement. 28 In addressing these two concerns, this paper aims to
formulate a solution that maximizes benefits by incentivizing
innovation as well as allowing these benefits to reach downstream users.
Through the lens of the development agenda, this paper seeks to
answer the research question of whether patents can be designed in a
way that maximizes the benefits to be distributed. Section I addresses
the legal status of the MGRs found in the ABNJ. Then, Section II
examines the effective working of the ABS framework so far and the
patentability of genetic material. Specifically, it will identify the role of
patents within this framework. Section III discusses the possible
solutions proposed by academics and states at different conferences.
Finally, it will be evaluated whether these solutions help reach the
result of equitable distribution in the last section. It is suggested that
given the political tensions and irreconcilability, the effective solution
may not lie in patents and ABS, but instead in “nondominium” or
trusteeship principles.

I.

Legal Status of the ABNJ and Policy
Background

Before delving into the equitable distribution of benefits, it is
important to gain a better understanding of where MGRs are found
within the ABNJ, and how they are placed within the existing legal
regime. This section will first define the ABNJ in legal terms. Then,
having identified the existing regulatory gap, this section will address
the possible solutions to resolve this issue. Finally, it will evaluate these
solutions, keeping in mind the concerns of the stakeholder, to identify
the appropriate legal status that would forge a path towards equitable
distribution and development.
A.

The Regulatory Gap — Access and Benefit Sharing of MGRs
beyond national jurisdiction

A unique characteristic of MGRs found within the ABNJ is that
these oceanic regions do not fall under the jurisdiction of any one
state. 29 Therefore, the resources found in such an area are not the
property of any one state. 30 As the present discussions concern genetic
material found in this area, the question of their legal status is more
complex. Three main legal instruments contribute to the legal regime:
the UNCLOS, 31 the CBD, 32 and the Trade Related Intellectual Property
28.

Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 4.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

UNCLOS, supra note 10.

32.

CBD, supra note 8.

202

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Who Owns Ocean Biodiversity?: The Legal Status and Role of Patents as a
Means to Achieve Equitable Distribution of Benefits

Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”). 33 One pillar of these three instruments
is the recognition of the State’s sovereign rights on the genetic resources
that reside within their territory. 34 These rights apply to genetic
resources found within national jurisdictions. 35
1.

The UNCLOS and MGRs Common Heritage of Mankind vs
Freedom of the High Seas

The ABNJ consists of the seabed, the ocean floor and subsoil, and
the high seas. 36 The high seas stretch beyond the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 37 the territorial and internal waters of states, and extend to the
geomorphological limits of the ocean. 38 Although the UNCLOS
mentions the mineral resources found within the ABNJ, 39 it makes no
mention of the genetic resources and activities such as marine
bioprospecting. 40 These concepts were not envisioned at the time of
drafting in 1982. 41 Even so, the UNCLOS remains relevant to our
discussion because it is known as the constitution of the oceans and is
concerned with the regulation of all activities carried out in the oceans
and the seas. 42
While the Area 43 and the water column 44 are governed by two
different regimes, MGRs can be found in both. 45 Part XI of the
UNCLOS regulates the seabed and deems it to be the common heritage

33.

Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IV
¶¶ 5–6, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 156 [hereinafter TRIPS]
(establishing oversight over intellectual property).

34.

CBD, supra note 8, at art. 3; Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 6 ¶
1.

35.

Id.

36.

See UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 1(1).

37.

See id. at art. 76.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at art. 77.

40.

See generally id.

41.

Hauiwen He, Limitations on Patenting Inventions Based on Marine
Genetic Resources, 29 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 521, 523
(2014).

42.

G.A. Res. 65/37, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2010).

43.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 1(1).

44.

Charlotte Salpin & Valentina Germani, Patenting of Research Results
Related to Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction:
The Crossroads of the Law of the Sea and Intellectual Property Law, 16
REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T. L. 12, 15–16 (2007).

45.

He, supra note 41, at 522.
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of mankind. 46 Specifically, Articles 136 and 137 provide that no State
shall claim to have sovereign rights over these resources, and that the
activities in the Area should be carried out for the benefit of all
mankind 47 and regulated by the International Seabed Authority.48
However, Part VII of the UNCLOS establishes that the water column
beyond national jurisdiction is open to all states and is subject to the
freedom of the high seas. 49 These freedoms include navigation and
fishing, but they are restricted as a result of the due regard given to
other states. 50
Currently, marine bioprospecting is carried out under the principle
of marine scientific research enshrined in Part XIII of the UNCLOS. 51
This principle generally governs research within the ABNJ, but is once
again restricted by the due regard given to the rights of other states. 52
The UNCLOS specifically states that such scientific research shall not
give rise to any legal claims to any part of the marine environment or
its resources. 53 Further, States are required to promote the transfer of
knowledge and flow of scientific data resulting from such research.54
Additionally, scientific research in the Area is required to be conducted
for the benefit of mankind as a whole. 55 This stipulates that States have
to act in aid of international cooperation, in scientific research, and the
transfer of technology, particularly to developing states. 56
This distinction leads to a fundamental problem when applying the
UNCLOS to MGRs; it is uncertain which framework would apply57
because their origin is not ascertainable. 58 If the research is carried out
46.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 136.

47.

Id. at arts. 136, 137.

48.

Id. at art. 137 (2).

49.

Id. at art. 87.

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at art. 143.

52.

Id. at art. 238.

53.

Id. at art. 241; Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, Marine Scientific Research
Activities as the Legal Basis for Intellectual Property Claims?, 22 MARINE
POL’Y 337, 342 (1998).

54.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 244.

55.

Id. at art. 143(1).

56.

Id. at art. 144.

57.

U.N. GAOR, Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the
Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond
areas of national jurisdiction addressed to the President of the General
Assembly, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/63/79 (May 16, 2008) [hereinafter A/63/79].

58.

Bonfanti & Trevisanut, supra note 4, at 193.
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in the Area, it obligates the States sponsoring such activities to conduct
due diligence and remain answerable to the International Seabed
Authority. 59 Further, they would be liable for damages if they failed to
comply. 60 Moreover, States would have to ensure that the research was
being conducted for the benefit of all mankind and show the equitable
distribution of benefits. 61 On the other hand, if the research was
conducted in the water column, the obligations placed on States to
ensure transfer of knowledge has a significantly less rigorous standard.62
The States would be free to access the MGRs within the ABNJ to
conduct marine bioprospecting and to do so without obligation to
ensure public availability of information or to distribute benefits among
developing States. 63
2.

Political Impasse — Diverging Opinion

There is considerable disagreement as to whether the MGRs are the
common heritage of mankind or whether the freedom of the high seas
must apply. 64 Although this regulatory gap has been identified
previously 65 and countries have put forth their diverging opinions,
arguably stemming from their vested interests, no consensus on which
regime must apply has yet been reached. 66 For instance, at the 2007
UN Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea,
several States reiterated their view that “all the resources of the Area,
including marine genetic resources were the ‘common heritage of

59.

See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area,
U.N. Doc ISBA/17/C/6 (Mar. 4, 2011) (requesting an advisory opinion
from the Seabed Disputes Chamber to the International Seabed Authority
on matters relating to the responsibilities and obligations of sponsoring
States).

60.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 139(2).

61.

Compare id. at 139(2), with id. at arts. 140, 144.

62.

See id. at art. 87(2).

63.

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF
SINGAPORE, REPORT OF THE BBNJ WORKSHOP ON THE
CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: PREPARING
FOR THE PREPCOM 6 (2016) [hereinafter CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW].

64.

See generally id.

65.

U.N. Secretary General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 227, U.N. Doc.
A/60/63/Add.1 (July 15, 2005).

66.

See id. ¶ 178.
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mankind.’” 67 Other delegations put forth a different view that these
resources fell outside the ambit of the UNCLOS and only customary
international law can apply. 68
Similar issues were raised at the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and the
sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national
jurisdiction, 69 through the Preparatory Committee. 70 Presently, the
Inter-governmental Conference is negotiating the new legally binding
instrument to apply to this regime. 71 However, even the most recent
discussion regarding this issue, the Second Session of the BBNJ
Conference, did not seem to make any progress towards reaching a
consensus. 72
3.

The Legal Status

As a result of the political impasse and the significance of the issue
at hand, there has been a high level of academic engagement with this
question. 73 As this question is not the focus of this article, I only briefly
touch on the arguments put forth by academics regarding which
interpretation supports the development agenda.
a.

The Positive Approach — “As it is”

The legal implication of the exclusion of genetic materials is
debateable. Genetic resources were omitted from the initial discussions
at the UNCLOS because it was then assumed that with the absence of
sunlight on the ocean floor, living organisms did not inhabit it. 74

67.

U.N. General Assembly, Report on the Work of the U.N. Open-Ended
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its
Eighth meeting, U.N. Doc. A/62/169, ¶ 71 (July 30, 2007).

68.

Id. ¶ 74.

69.

G.A. Res. 59/24, ¶ 73 (Nov. 17, 2005); U.N. General Assembly, Letter
dated Mar. 16, 2010 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended
Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, ¶¶
71–72, U.N. Doc. A/65/68 (Mar. 17, 2010).

70.

G.A. Res. 69/292, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2015).

71.

See G.A. Dec. 74/543, U.N. Doc. A/74/L.41 (Mar. 9, 2020).

72.

Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding
Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity
of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Statement by the President of the
Conference at the Closing of the Third Session, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.232/2019/10 (Sept. 13, 2019) [hereinafter BBNJ Conference].

73.

See, e.g., Beslier, supra note 3; Blasiak et al., supra note 19.

74.

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 63, at 8.
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However, today we know that a wide variety of organisms live near or
at the seafloor of the Area. 75
Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
(“VCLT”) 76 rule of general interpretation seems imperative to interpret
the treaty provisions and will serve as the point of departure for this
analysis. As the VCLT has repeatedly been referred to as customary
international law by the International Court of Justice77 and the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, 78 its applicability here
cannot be denied.
Adopting a positive approach, Marciniak analyzed the legal
implication of this omission by applying literal, teleological, and
contextual interpretations. 79 If a literal interpretation is applied, it
could be argued that the UNCLOS does not extend to MGRs. 80
However, when a more functional approach is taken, it is required that
the treaty be interpreted while keeping in mind its object or purpose,81
usually set out in its preamble. 82 Although the preamble of the
UNCLOS acknowledges that “matters not regulated by this Convention
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general
international law,” it emphasizes the need for equitable and efficient
utilization of the ocean’s resources. 83 Bearing in mind that the goals of
the convention “contribute to realising a ‘just’ and ‘equitable’
international economic order,” 84 it can be argued that the achievement
of this goal should be of paramount importance. Although this may not
automatically call for the application of the CHM to the whole regime,85
75.

Id.

76.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].

77.

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J.
14 ¶ 65 (Apr. 20).

78.

Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in
the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Seabed
Disputes Chamber), Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 2011,
10 ¶ 57.

79.

Konrad Jan Marciniak, Marine Genetic Resources: Do They Form Part
of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?, in NATURAL RESOURCES
AND
THE
LAW ON THE SEA: EXPLORATION, ALLOCATION,
EXPLOITATION OR NATURAL RESOURCES IN AREAS UNDER NATIONAL
JURISDICTION AND BEYOND, 373, 384–385 (2017).

80.

U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 4 mtg. ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/62/169 (July 30, 2007).

81.

RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 209–11 (2nd ed. 2015).

82.

VCLT, supra note 76, at art. 31(2).

83.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, pmbl.

84.

Id.

85.

Marciniak, supra note 79, at 387.
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it points to the fact that at least a few principles of the CHM should
apply.
A functional analysis of the VCLT’s Article 31(3) calls for an indepth interpretation of the travaux preparatoires and subsequent
developments. However, this interpretation is subjective. Marciniak
concludes that there was no basis to argue that the MGRs were ever
included within the CHM principle. 86 However, given the subjectivity
of such an interpretation, others seem to disagree. In Correa’s opinion,
the UNGA Resolution 25/2749, which declared that the Area and its
resources were the common heritage of mankind and laid the basis for
Part XI of the UNCLOS, was not limited to minerals. 87
From this brief analysis it appears that the application of Article
31 of the VCLT may not lend itself to the argument that MGRs are
effectively covered under Part XI of the UNCLOS in a strict legal sense.
However, nothing would stop the conclusion of a supporting agreement
that derived principles from the objectives of the UNCLOS.
b.

The Normative Approach — ‘As it should be’

While the new treaty is still being negotiated and the draft text is
yet to be prepared, 88 I argue that it is imperative to look at this question
through the lens of “what ought to be.” Given the significance of this
debate to the scientific advancement and the development agenda, this
article will aim to achieve these objectives through the arguments raised
and solutions proposed.
The UNCLOS cannot be applied in isolation from other treaties
and instruments of international law. 89 Keeping this in mind, those
applying Article 31 of the VCLT should keep in mind the wider
objectives of the general body of international law.
Furthering these objectives, an International Institute for
Environment and Development (“IIED”) study90 argued that if we were

86.

Id. at 401.

87.

Carols M. Correa, Access to and Benefit Sharing of Marine Genetic
Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction: Developing a New Legally
Binding Instrument, 79 SOUTH CENTRE 1, 9 (Sept. 2017).

88.

See generally G.A. Dec. 74/543, supra note 71.

89.

See James Harrison, Reflections on the Role of International Courts and
Tribunals in the Settlement of Environmental Disputes and the
Development of International Environmental Law, 25 J. ENV’T L. 501,
506 (2013) (explaining a matter where an adjudicatory body held treaty
rules were not to be held in isolation from the rest of the body of public
international law).

90.

Eleftheria Asimakopoulou & Essam Yassin Mohammad, Marine Genetic
Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: A ‘Common Heritage
of Mankind,’ IIED BRIEFING (2019).
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to shift the lens of our analysis to the wider body of international law,91
it can be seen that the international courts do not view the oceans in a
similar manner. 92
For example, in South China Sea Arbitration, the Permanent Court
of Arbitration was called upon to decide the Philippines’ challenge to
maritime claims made by China. 93 The Court recognized that the
countries had a duty to preserve marine environment both within the
national jurisdiction and without. 94 This demonstrates that the division
of the maritime zones as the high seas or the Area, and regulating them
through the use of different legal regimes, is artificial. 95 The courts do
not adhere to these artificial zones in their interpretations, and as a
result, these divisions are obsolete. 96 These artificial divisions should
not act to the detriment of the wider agenda of development and
scientific advancement. This interpretation affirmed that other
provisions within the treaty as well as the general corpus of
international law could inform the core framework of the UNCLOS. 97
Further, the term “environment” under the UNCLOS was
interpreted in light of the CBD definition of “ecosystem” as a “dynamic
complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their
non-living environment interacting as a functional unit.” 98 In doing so,
the Court incorporated the “ecosystem approach” into Part XII of the
UNCLOS concerning the marine environment. 99 As a result, living and
non-living organisms in ABNJ are interconnected with their habitat,
and form an indivisible ecosystem. 100
To apply this approach in practice requires uniform regulation of
marine resources. As discussed, the CHM principle already applies to
“any solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area,
91.

Id. at 2–3.

92.

Id.

93.

South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, Case No. 2013-19,
¶ 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

94.

Id. at ¶¶ 940–941.

95.

Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 2.

96.

Id.

97.

Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Interpretation of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS
by the Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration: A Critique, 50
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 49, 56 (2019).

98.

CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2.

99.

DUNCAN E.J. CYRRIE & MISCHA DAVIS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
RELEVANT TO MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION
SUBMISSION
TO
THE
CHAIR
(2016),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/greenpeace.p
df [https://perma.cc/9Z2U-R97G].

100. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2.
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including polymetallic nodules.” 101 Therefore, to achieve uniformity in
the regulation of marine resources, the CHM must also apply to MGRs.
Therefore, if we were to look at the issue of the legal status of
MGRs within the ABNJ through this wider lens, it is possible to extend
the interpretation of Part XI of the UNCLOS to MGRs. The case for
basing the new instrument on the CHM principle can be made stronger
if the interests of science and development are considered.
4.

In the Interest of Science and Development

Further, the principle that certain areas are to be used for the
benefit of all exists as a general principle of law even outside the scope
of the UNCLOS. 102 If a normative approach applied to Article 31(3)(c)
of the VCLT, the general principles of international law, including this
principle, could be included in this interpretation.
The preamble of the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”)
highlights that,
the importance, for all the peoples of the world, of safeguarding
this unique and irreplaceable [cultural and natural] property, to
whatever people it may belong . . . considering that parts of the
cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and
therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of
mankind as a whole. 103

Given that the exceptional habitats, sensitive and endangered
species of the ABNJ are of outstanding universal value (“OUV”) as
recognized under the WHC, 104 it is likely to be regarded as world
heritage. If the marine sites of the ABNJ are recognized as world
heritage, then that further necessitates the theory that the benefits
accruing from their exploitation or exploration should be shared by
humanity as a whole. 105
This principle is also recognized by the ICJ. In his separate opinion,
Judge Weeramantry acknowledged that the earth’s resources are “not
individually, but collectively owned.” 106 The principle of intra and intergenerational equity was acknowledged in the well-known Nuclear
101. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 133.
102. Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes around Comes around: How UNCLOS
Ratification Will Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law,
7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 70 (2009).
103. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
104. Id.
105. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 3.
106. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep. 7, 107 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.).
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Weapons Advisory Opinion. 107 In recognizing that the environment
“represents the very health of human beings, including generations
unborn,” 108 the Court upheld the right of present and future generations
to not only live in a healthy environment, but to also have its natural
elements fairly and equitably shared. 109
The right to share in scientific advancement and its benefits is
recognized in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”). 110 Although the UDHR is not a legally binding
instrument, 111 academics have acknowledged that the provisions could
evolve to form binding norms as customary international law. 112 Even
though the academics arguing that the UDHR is customary
international law in toto are in the minority, 113 it is still worth arguing
because scientific advancement is indispensable to development. 114
In an indivisible ecosystem such as the ABNJ, 115 applying the
equitable distribution principles enshrined in the preamble of the
UNCLOS can only be effectively realized through the applying the
CHM principle. Moreover, developing countries likely could be excluded
from both access and benefit-sharing of scientific research into MGRs
without uniform regulation of scientific exploration regarding MGRs in
ABNJ. That, by itself, would constitute a violation of the “human right
to science” which includes the right to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits. 116
While the UNCLOS omitted to include MGRs within its core
framework, 117 a new internationally binding instrument is being
negotiated. 118 However, even though this regulatory gap has been
identified for some time now, it is still unclear which legal regime would
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27
(Dec. 10, 1948).
111. Richard Pierre Claude & Bernardo W. Issel, Health, Medicine and Science
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 HEALTH & HUM. RTS.
126, 139.
112. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 102.
113. Hurst Huannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, 3
HEALTH & HUM. RTS.144, 148 (1998).
114. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 102.
115. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 3.
116. See, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 110, art. 27.
117. Asimakopoulou & Mohammad, supra note 90, at 1.
118. Id.
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apply. 119 By briefly engaging with the implications of the application of
the legal regimes on the development agenda, it is concluded that the
application of CHM to the MGRs within the ABNJ would help achieve
the most equitable solution.
Acknowledging the lack of political consensus, 120 this section aims
to take the discussions further by briefly interpreting the treaty’s
provisions. In doing so, I kept in mind the overarching objective of this
article: to arrive at a solution that is in the best interest of scientific
advancement and development.
If the VCLT was applied in a narrow sense and with a positive
approach, the freedom of the high seas would apply to the MGRs within
the ABNJ. However, these interpretations are subjective and academic
opinions differed when employing similar interpretations. 121 Given the
lack of academic consensus, this article adopts a normative approach
to this legal analysis. By identifying the developments in other areas of
international law and applying them to the issue at hand, this section
identified that arguments for applying the CHM principle to the new
instrument could be made through the viewpoints regarding the right
to the science, inter and intra-generational equity, and world heritage.
Therefore, although the lack of political consensus on the legal
status of MGRs within the ABNJ poses a problem to the development
agenda, 122 the problem can be avoided by applying a normative
approach to the legal analysis. Even though the question of the
management of resources could also be discussed without any
agreement on the legal status, this might result in the formulation of
“a dependent and normatively incoherent governance regime.” 123 The
analysis of the most equitable solution will progress under the
assumption that the CHM principle applies.

119. See, Kogan, supra note 102, at 46.
120. Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National
Jurisdictions: Components of a Fair, Informed and Progressive
Internationally
Binding
Legal
Instrument,
SSRN
(2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215356
[https://perma.cc/WC9T-9F4M].
121. See Chuxiao Yu, Implications of the UNCLOS Marine Scientific Research
Regime for the Current Negotiations on Access and Benefit Sharing of
Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 51
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 2, 5 (2019).
122. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions,
supra note 120.
123. Id.
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II.

The Role of Patents within the Access and
Benefit-sharing Framework

Building on the legal analysis above, this section seeks to address
the second regulatory gap found in the biodiversity law, namely the
access and benefit-sharing (“ABS”) of genetic resources originating
beyond national jurisdiction. A central aim of this chapter is to analyze
the role of patents within the ABS framework and how they can be
designed more effectively and efficiently. First, this chapter will outline
this regulatory gap within the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and
identify the role of patents within the ABS framework. Then, the article
outlines the requirements of patent protection for MGRs. Having placed
the role and the nature of patent protection within the ABS, the
chapter then identifies how each of these could hinder the delivery of
benefits to all.
A.

The Regulatory Gap - Genetic Resources Beyond National
Jurisdiction

Much like the gap within the UNCLOS, the scientific inventions
derived from MGRs within the ABNJ go unregulated in biodiversity
law. 124 This section will deal with the legal issues surrounding the CBD
and TRIPS regarding the equitable distribution of these resources.
1.

Biodiversity Law and MGRs

In 1992, the adoption of the CBD established a broad framework
for member states to implement national laws directed at the
conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of the components, and
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic
resources. 125 With 196 contracting parties, 126 the CBD has become the
main framework used by the international community to protect
against the loss of biodiversity. 127 Sovereignty, prior informed consent
(“PIC”) and mutually agreed terms (“MAT”) have become the tools to
ensure the benefit-sharing. 128

124. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 1.
125. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 1.
126. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VW9W-DS6U].

DIVERSITY,

127. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, OCEAN HEALTH INDEX,
http://www.oceanhealthindex.org/methodology/components/convention
-on-biological-diversity [https://perma.cc/47SE-LRLR].
128. MULLER, supra note 27, at 4.
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The Nagoya Protocol was adopted to clarify and strengthen the
benefit-sharing laid down in the CBD. 129 It aimed to do so by
facilitating the sharing of benefits in a fair and equitable manner by
establishing a transnational Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House
(“ABS Clearing House”). 130 Both the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol
recognize “mutually agreed terms” that provide that specific access and
benefit-sharing conditions must be agreed upon by users and providers
of genetic resources. 131 The Nagoya Protocol also establishes the
issuance of internationally recognized certificates by the relevant
national authority, which certify that a genetic resource has been
obtained, accessed, and used per prior consent of the national authority
having jurisdiction over the genetic resource. 132 Where PIC is not
possible, Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol calls for the establishment
of the “global multi-lateral benefit sharing mechanism.” 133 It states,
Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations or for
which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent. 134

The words “it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent” 135 have been said to imply that the global multilateral
mechanism includes MGRs within ABNJ. 136 Although this provision
appears to fill the gap identified in the UNCLOS above, the Preamble
of the Nagoya Protocol reaffirms that it applies to “the sovereign rights
of States over their natural resources and according to the provisions
of the Convention.” 137 Therefore, it would be difficult to interpret the
129. See About the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/convention/ [https://perma.cc/X2C2X8DW].
130. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 1; CBD, supra note 8, at art.
18(3).
131. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 18; CBD, supra note 8, at art. 15.
132. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 17.
133. Id. at art. 10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Su Jin Park, Changes in the Law of Marine Genetic Resources
in the ABNJ and under the UNCLOS, in OCEAN LAW DEBATES: THE
50-YEAR LEGACY AND EMERGING ISSUES 419, 420 (Harry N. Scheiber et
al. eds., 2018).
137. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, pmbl.
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Nagoya Protocol as applying outside the boundaries of the CBD, whose
jurisdictional scope only stretches within national jurisdictions. 138 The
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol apply to areas beyond national
jurisdiction in so much as the States are regulating the activities of
their own nationals. 139
In areas beyond national jurisdiction, Article 5 of the CBD provides
that States must cooperate directly with each other or through
competent international organizations for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. 140 The geographical coverage of
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol once again leave the regulatory gap
of access and benefit-sharing agreements for MGRs within ABNJ.
2.

Intellectual Property Rights, ABS frameworks and MGRs

As MGRs originating from ABNJ are used to invent life-saving
pharmaceuticals and biofuels, 141 it is increasingly important to promote
bioprospecting and innovation. Intellectual property protection,
specifically patents, may help promote both. Patents provide timed
exclusive rights to the creator in exchange for disclosure of information
required to replicate the invention. 142
The CBD explicitly recognizes that IPRs may have an impact on
the implementation of its objectives to the extent that they involve the
assertion of private rights of ownership over biodiversity-generated
innovations. 143 In particular, intellectual property clauses may influence
mutually agreed upon terms with regard to the utilization of genetic
resources. 144 But given the lack of clarity on the ABS framework

138. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 4; see generally BEVIS FEDDER, MARINE
GENETIC RESOURCES, ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING: LEGAL AND
BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (2013).
139. See generally Frédéric Jacquemont & Alejandro Caparrós, The Convenion
on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Convention 10 Years After
Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes?, 11 RECIEL 169 (2002).
140. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 5.
141. See, e.g., Marjo Vierros et al., Who Owns the Ocean? Policy Issues
Surrounding Marine Genetic Resources, 25 LIMNOLOGY &
OCEANOGRAPHY BULL. 29, 29–35 (2016).
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
ORG.,
142. See
Patents,
WORLD
https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ [https://perma.cc/8WYS-SH8A].
143. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 1; Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15, at arts. 1,
15.
144. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ISSUES IN ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING AGREEMENTS 10 (2018).

215

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Who Owns Ocean Biodiversity?: The Legal Status and Role of Patents as a
Means to Achieve Equitable Distribution of Benefits

applicable to MGRs within ABNJ, 145 the intellectual property
protection for these resources remains unregulated.
However, before considering the overall impact of patents within
the ABS framework, it is imperative to discuss the requirements for the
patentability of inventions derived from MGRs.
3.

Patentability of MGR-based inventions and processes

A patent is an “exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a
product or a process that offers a new technical solution to a problem
or provides a new way of doing something.” 146 At the outset, it seems
the exclusive rights granted under patents principally clash with the
CHM principle. However, after much academic debate, there is a broad
consensus that no conceptual conflict exists between the UNCLOS
provisions on marine scientific research and the objectives of intellectual
property protection. 147 They are both founded on the belief that
universality of scientific knowledge is a foundation for the advancement
of mankind. 148
Once a patent is secured, it gives the patent owner the exclusive
right to prevent others from commercially exploiting the patented
invention for the period in which the invention is protected. 149 Patent
rights are subject to territoriality, thus a patent needs to be sought
distinctly in each country or region. 150 For example, the European
Patent Convention (“EPC”) only applies to the patents registered
within the territory of each contracting State. 151 Although granted by
sovereign States, the basic pre-requisites to obtain a patent have

145. GLEN WRIGHT ET AL., THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: NEGOTIATING
A TREATY FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE
BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 34 (2016),
https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-31928-iddrihaute-mer.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM77-LVTX].
146. Patents, supra note 142.
147. See Eve Heafey, Access and Benefit Sharing of Marine Genetic Resources
from Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Intellectual Property – Friend,
Not Foe, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 498 (2014); He, supra note 41, 527–30;
Salpin & Germani, supra note 44.
148. See, e.g., Dana Dalrymple, Scientific Knowledge as a Global Public Good:
Contributions to Innovation and the Economy, in THE ROLE OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 35, 36 (2003); UNCLOS, supra
note 10, pmbl.
149. See Patents, supra note 142.
150. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 144, at 28.
151. European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
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reached harmonization. 152 This is largely a result of international trade.
The main requirements can be identified as being: novelty, inventive
step, and industrial utility.153
a.

Novelty, Inventive Step and Industrial Application

TRIPS requires patents be available for inventions in “all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application.” 154 These requirements need to be
fulfilled for a grant of a patent application. 155 First, novelty refers to an
invention possessing a novel characteristic that is not present in the
existing body of knowledge, termed as “prior art.” 156 With regard to
MGRs found in the ABNJ, this requirement should be relatively easy
to satisfy because marine bioprospecting for these resources is still at
the nascent stages. 157 However, for genetic material, the second
requirement of an inventive step may be the deciding factor. Intellectual
property refers to creations of the mind, like inventions, literary and
artistic works, as well as designs, symbols, names and images used for
commercial purposes. 158 The invention must have an inventive or nonobvious step that an ordinary person with reasonable skill could not
have come up with. 159 Mere discovery of a living organism that occurs
in nature is not eligible for patent protection. 160 Therefore, marine life
152. See, e.g., Suma Athreye, Lucia Piscitello, & Kenneth C. Shadlen, TwentyFive Years since TRIPS: Patent Policy and International Business, 13 J.
INT’L BUS. POL’Y. 315, 316 (2020).
153. Conditions for a Patent, SWEDISH INTELL. PROP. OFFICE,
https://www.prv.se/en/patents/applying-for-a-patent/before-theapplication/conditions-for-a-patent/ [https://perma.cc/EZX6-MUUT].
154. TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27.
155. See id.
156. Jeffrey M. Kaden, Patent Protection and the Novelty Requirement,
GOTTLIEB, RACKMAN, & REISMAN, P.C.,
https://grr.com/publications/patent-protection-novelty-requirement/
[https://perma.cc/M36A-KQSQ].
157. See, e.g., GLEN WRIGHT ET AL., THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD
CONTINUES: TOWARDS A NEW AGREEMENT ON HIGH SEAS
GOVERNANCE 14,
https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/st0116_g
w-et-al._high-seas.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4CP-JYLH].
158. What is Intellectual Property? WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo. int/about-ip/en/ [https://perma.cc/S383-WZYY].
159. TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27.
160. See Jake Mace, Can a Living Organism be Patented? The Quick Answer
WIRE
(July
31,
2017),
is
“Sometimes”,
IP
http://ipwire.com/stories/patentability-living-organisms/
[https://perma.cc/N4L8-9DP5].
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forms and access to MGRs may not themselves be patented.161
Regarding derivatives of these organisms or genetically modified
organisms, national laws differ. 162 Essentially, they need to be subject
to human intervention but the degree of intervention varies between
jurisdictions. 163
In the European Union (“EU”), inventions stemming from genetic
material could be considered patentable inventions if they are isolated
from their natural environments or produced by a technological
process. 164 In the United States (“US”), patenting genetic material is
more stringent following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Association of
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc. 165 which stated that
merely isolating DNA was not enough to fulfil the novelty
requirement. 166 However, this added hurdle is not insurmountable. It is
quite simple for businesses to derive DNA from the genetic material
which remains patentable. 167
On the other hand, in the case of genetic material there may be
ethical implications to consider. Patent applications under the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) are subject to cultural and moral
considerations, termed ordre public. 168 So, although derivations of
genetic material are patentable, applications will only be granted if the
derivatives do not offend public morality. 169
To comply with the first two requirements of “novelty” and
“inventive step,” it is important not to disclose technical information

161. Kristen E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak
Future for Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United
Nations Law of the Sea Consultative Process on Marine Genetic
Resources, 5 LOY. INT’L L. REV. 151, 159 (2008).
162. See e.g., Alice Yuen-Ting Wong & Albert Wai-Kit Chan, Genetically
modified foods in China and the United States: A primer of regulation
and intellectual property protection, 5 FOOD SCI. & HUM. WELLNESS 124
(2016); Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third
Dimension of GMO Regulation, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 257 (2007).
163. See generally Jan Holthuis & Marc van der Velden et al., Plant variety
rights versus plant patents: legal developments and frictions in a regional
perspective, 20 BUS. L. INT’L 96 (2019).
164. Council Directive 98/44, arts. 20 & 21, 1998 O.J. (L.213) 13.
165. Assn. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc. 569 U.S. 576
(2013).
166. Id. at 18.
167. See Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Alice and Something More: The Drift
Towards European Patent Jurisprudence, 3 J. L. BIOSCIENCE 693 (2016).
168. Council Directive 98/44, art. 36, 1998 O.J. (L.213) 13.
169. Id. at art. 37.
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about the invention before submitting the patent application.170
However, the technical information about the invention must be
disclosed to the public in a patent application, which then becomes a
valuable source of information for inventors, enterprises, and
researchers. 171 This early disclosure of information may prejudice a later
patent application, particularly regarding MGRs—which will be
discussed in a later section of this Chapter.
Finally, the invention must also be capable of industrial application
and do more than further a theoretical purpose. 172 This requirement
may pose a significant hurdle to patents for MGR-based inventions. As
the end-to-end process of bioprospecting for genetic material can take
years with very few MGRs progressing to the clinical trial stage,173
industrial application can only be achieved at the end. Therefore, there
is not an adequate incentive to conduct marine scientific research
through the current patent regime.
b.

The impact of patents on the ABS Framework

Now that this paper discussed the prerequisites for the patentability
of MGRs within the ABNJ, it is essential to analyze the impact of
patents on the efficiency of the ABS framework to effectively answer
the research question. As mentioned earlier, while the granting of
patents has an impact on the implementation of the CBD’s objective
of equitable distribution, 174 it remains unclear what the impact would
be.
Many States have expressed their concerns regarding intellectual
property claims over inventions derived from MGRs within ABNJ.175
These States generally fear that granting IPRs to these discoveries may
result in less knowledge available to the public. 176 On the other hand,
some States insist that restricting the intellectual property regime
regarding MGRs will decrease incentives for investments, thereby
stifling research and development in this field and depriving the public
170. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 144, at 28.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 59.
174. See Catherine Monagle, Biodiversity & Intellectual Property Rights:
Reviewing Intellectual Property Rights in Light of the Objectives of the
Convention
on
Biological
Diversity,
WWF
(Mar.
2011),
https://www.ciel.org/Publications/tripsmay01.PDF
[https://perma.cc/N2HV-VPDM].
175. See Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group,
Letter Dated Mar. 16, 2010 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc
Open-Ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/65/68 (Mar. 17, 2010), [hereinafter “A/65/68”].
176. See id. at 73.
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of valuable advancements. 177 In essence, to arrive at the best possible
solution, the regime should provide incentives to continue discovering
the mysteries of the ABNJ while ensuring a fair and equitable sharing
of benefits of the research. 178
Article 16(5) of the CBD requires member States to cooperate in
this regard subject to national legislations and international law; this
ensures that such rights are supportive and do not run counter to its
objectives. 179 Therefore, it is essential that the concerns regarding
intellectual property claims over inventions derived from MGRs within
ABNJ are addressed at the BBNJ.
Further, in recent years, the ABS framework and its core premise
of sharing the benefits that arise from utilization have come into
question. 180 Keeping this in mind, and the concerns raised by the States,
this article considers whether patents will hinder or help the delivery of
benefits to all.
4.

Effectively using Patents to Improve the Efficiency of the ABS
Framework

Within international law, benefit-sharing is used to imply an
international obligation, a treaty objective, a right, a mechanism or a
safeguard. 181 There is no single definition of the concept and it is yet to
be fully developed or become satisfactorily operational.182 However,
even to the extent that it has been put into practice, it has not been
the success that it was touted to be and rarely reaches its objectives.183
With reference to developing technology in the research and
development process of genetic resources, Muller identified
shortcomings within the ABS framework. 184 Muller’s 2018 study
identifies that limitations of the ABS framework persist and almost no
177. See e.g., Salpin & Germani, supra note 44, at 23.
178. See id.
179. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 16(5)
180. MULLER, supra note 27.
181. Elisa Morgera, An International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable
Benefit-Sharing, 2 (Univ. Edinburgh School of L. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 6, 2015).
182. See D. Schroeder, Benefit Sharing: It’s Time for a Definition, 33 J. MED.
ETHICS 205, 205 (2007).
183. See e.g., SARAH LAIRD & RACHEL WYNBERG, ACCESS AND BENEFIT
SHARING: KEY POINTS FOR POLICY-MAKERS – INDUSTRIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY, ABS CAPACITY DEV. INITIATIVE (Nov. 2015),
http://www.absinitiative.info/fileadmin/media/Knowledge_Center/Pulications/Sectoral
_Briefs/Sectoral_Brief_-_Botanicals-_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5L4-W7EQ].
184. MULLER, supra note 27, at 1–2.
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monetary benefits are shared among users and providers. 185 To remain
effective, the ABS framework must accommodate the realities of
research and development and catch up with technological advances.186
Muller’s study conducts a qualitative assessment on ABS by examining
the shifting interests of stakeholders. 187 It highlights a noticeable
imbalance between high investments in ABS and the relatively low
returns and results. 188 It unearthed the underlying inefficiency issues in
an ABS regime that relies on contracts to capture fair and equitable
benefits. 189 The empirical study also identified that in the last two
decades, the investment in ABS has reduced and the monetary benefits
derived from it have “flatlined.” 190 Thus, the only true indicators of
economic value are gleaned from products that reach the market. 191
Further, the difficultly in quantifying non-monetary benefits has
rendered benefit-sharing a mere tick-boxing exercise, where the users
merely must claim these benefits have been shared. 192 Non-monetary
benefits can be in the form of jobs created, technical assistance, etc.193
They are generated as part of more traditional research cooperation
between countries and institutions. 194
In summary, both a lack of monetary benefits and the difficulty in
tracing the non-monetary benefits explain to the inefficiency of the ABS
Framework. Notably, this difficulty in tracing non-monetary benefits
makes the monitoring of monetary benefits even more important.
Professor Thambisetty proposes that such monitoring is only possible
if we link international biodiversity law with the patent system. 195 So
far, this theory has been avoided because users would be forced to share

185. Id.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id. at 6–8.
188. Id.
189. Mueller, supra note 27, at 6.
190. Id. at 8.
191. OLDHAM ET AL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T FOOD & RURAL AFF., VALUING THE
DEEP: MARINE GENETIC RESOURCES IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION 152 (2014).
192. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions,
supra note 120.
193. Carlos M. Correa, Access to and Benefit Sharing of Marine Genetic
Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction: Developing a New Legally
Binding Instrument, 79 SOUTH CENTRE 1, 15 (Sept. 2017).
194. Id.
195. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions,
supra note 120.
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monetary benefits. 196 However, this interlinking is important to note
because it shows that patents could be used not only to monitor
monetary benefits, but also to increase them. This final section
identifies the technical and legal requirements that might hinder such
an interlinking.
B.

Hindrances to the Interlinking of the Patent System and
International Biodiversity Law

In the years leading up to the recent conferences, academics and
experts identified three distinct problems with intellectual property
rights and MGRs. 197 These problems include identification of loopholes
within digital sequencing information (“DSI”), disclosure of origin
(“DOO”) requirements, and corporate control of intellectual
properties. 198 Each of these factors will be examined with particular
reference to MGRs, their values, and economic benefits.
1.

Disclosure of origin requirements

Disclosure is a part of the core rationale of patent law—unless an
invention is fully disclosed, the patent granted to the invention is
invalid. 199 Applicants may be required to disclose the invention, method
of creation, any prior art, the true inventor, and the legal basis for the
entitlement. 200 However, currently neither the Patent Cooperation
Treaty nor any other multilateral intellectual property mandates that
countries impose a genetic resource DOO requirement in patent
applications. 201 Currently, such a requirement is solely a matter for
national and regional law. 202
As identified above, the only true indicators of actual benefit
accrued from MGRs are products that reach the market. 203 However,
with only the present disclosure requirements in place, it is nearly
196. Id.
197. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 1.
198. Id.
199. WIPO, WIPO Technical Study on Patent Disclosure Requirements
Related to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, STUDY NO. 3,
1, 2 (2004).
200. Id.
201. Margo A. Bagley, Of Disclosure “Straws” and IP System “Camels”:
Patents, Innovation, and the Disclosure of Origin Requirement, in
TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE:
THE
WIPO
PROTECTING
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 1, 1
(Daniel Robinson et al. eds., 2017).
202. Id.
203. OLDHAM

ET AL.,

supra note 191, at 165.
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impossible to look at products in the market and trace it back to
MGRs. 204 Strict confidentiality clauses protecting market-related data
and a lack of adequate methodological transparency in commercial
disclosure have contributed to this impossibility. 205
The existence of a mandatory DOO requirement is immaterial to
patent applications because patent applications are only concerned with
the origin of the invention. 206 However, without such a requirement
there is no easy way to ascertain whether the inventors are compliant
with the applicable ABS regulations. 207 Moreover, the benefits that
could potentially accrue from this are likely going unmonitored.
Therefore, a mandatory DOO requirement is imperative to the ABS
framework, both for the creation of non-monetary benefits by displaying
greater methodological transparency and for the monitoring of
monetary benefits.
2.

Digital Sequence Information

With advances in technology, genetic material and data are being
deposited into GenBanks in digital form. 208 This is termed as DSI.209
Although there is no single definition, DSI contains information that
originates from the analysis of the data contained in a digital file with
a precise order of nucleotides, amino acids, or molecular structure of
proteins. 210 DSI is also capable of disclosing more information about
genetic make-up, such as the evolutionary process leading to adaptation
in the living organisms through DNA barcodes. 211 At present, DSI,
which is available as open-access data, goes unregulated or even
unacknowledged by the CBD and Nagoya Protocol.212
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See WIPO, supra note 199, at 72.
207. Correa, supra note 193, at 15–16.
208. SARAH LAIRD & RACHEL WYNBERG, A FACT FINDING AND SCOPING
STUDY ON DIGITAL SEQUENCE INFORMATION ON GENETIC RESOURCES
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND
NAGOYA PROTOCOL ¶¶ 12–13 (2018).
209. Id. ¶ 12.
210. Digital Sequence Information, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
BRAZIL – ENVIRONMENT DIVISION, https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSIviews/Brazil-DSI.pdf [https://perma.cc/335Z-LWH6].
211. See generally Paul Hebert et al., Biological Identifications Through DNA
Barcodes, 270 PROC. BIO. SCI. 313 (2003).
212. Claudio Chiarolla, Intellectual Property Rights and Benefit Sharing from
Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction:
Current Discussions and Regulatory Options, 4 QUEEN MARY J. OF
INTELL. PROP. 171, 173 (2014).
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A key reason for this relates to the definition of genetic resources
under the CBD as being genetic material of actual or potential value,
which has been interpreted as “matter.” 213 From this, it follows that
the intangible DSI cannot constitute genetic resources as defined by the
CBD. 214 At the time of the formulation of the CBD, ABS was intended
to show the application of modern biotechnology by assessing the
usefulness of genes and biochemicals, rather than accessing genetic
resources. 215 As technology advanced, it is possible that biotechnological
R&D can potentially add a lot of value to the genetic resources. This
narrow definition has also led to the obscuration of the true object of
ABS: information, whether tangible or intangible. 216
This means that the user countries do not have to pay provider
countries for the benefit just because the information consists of genetic
sequence data. 217 In 2019, Blasiak found that there has been an
exponential increase in public databases of DSI. 218 This in turn has
roused the indignation of provider countries as they do not deem the
benefit of public accessibility of the data to be enough to give up
national patrimony. 219 Therefore, this exclusion leaves valuable genetic
sequences unregulated and contributes to the inefficiency of the ABS
framework.
3.

Corporate Control

One core component of the CHM principle is that all nations must
share benefits amongst each other, fairly and equitably. 220 Frakes has
interpreted this to require restraining of profit-making activities of
corporate entities. 221 Therefore, one important measure of an efficient
ABS regime for MGRs is if their benefits are shared and the profitmaking activities of corporations are curbed.
213. CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2.
214. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL SEQUENCE
INFORMATION AND THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL: SUBMISSION TO THE CBD
1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter ICC Paper].
215. MULLER, supra note 27, at 8.
216. ICC Paper, supra note 214, at 1–2.
217. Id. at 3–4.
218. Blasiak et al., Scientists Should Disclose Origin in Marine Gene Patents,
34 Trends, ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1, 3 (2019) [hereinafter Blasiak
2019].
219. WYNBERG & LAIRD, supra note 208, ¶ 37.
220. Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the
Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and
Developing Nations Reach a Compromise? 21 WIS. INT’L L. J. 409, 412
(2003).
221. Id.
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Blasiak found that nearly 84% of MGR patents are owned by
companies. 222 “Public and private universities accounted for another
12%, while entities such as governmental bodies, individuals, hospitals,
and non-profit research institutes registered the remaining 4%.” 223 The
world’s largest chemical manufacturer, German-based BASF, held
nearly 47% of the patent sequences. 224 The second and third largest
companies were based in Japan and the US, respectively. 225 Moreover,
international patent claims have been made by entities in 30 countries
and the EU, while the remaining 165 countries remain unrepresented.226
Correa explicitly states that these are, by nature, international
public goods; because of this nature, they should not be appropriated
under private rights, such as patents, conferred by governments. 227 It is
further agreed that benefits accrued to private commercial concerns
should be capped and efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits
are shared between users and providers. 228 Although patents are a timed
protection, tying up these inventions for a period of 20 years could
majorly hinder scientific progress. 229
However, given the high costs of marine bioprospecting, 230 it is
highly unlikely that corporations or other users would undertake this
long process without the incentive of patents. If a more equitable
solution is reached without compromising the incentive to innovate, it
could potentially create more benefits that can be shared equitably.
With that, three hindrances to the achievement of an effective ABS
framework have been identified. Regarding DSI and DOO, the main
argument between proponents and opponents is that inclusion of these
requirements would help increase monetary benefits but would also
result in the simultaneous increase of legal uncertainty. 231 Further, the
Blasiak’s 2019 study leaves the intriguing question of whether patents
222. Blasiak et al., supra note 19, at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. CARLOS M. CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, ACCESS TO AND BENEFIT
SHARING OF MARINE GENETIC RESOURCES BEYOND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION: DEVELOPING A NEW LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT 2
(2017).
228. Graham Nicholson, The Common Heritage of Mankind and Mining: An
Analysis of the Law as to the High Seas, Outer Space, the Antarctic, and
World Heritage, 6 N.Z. J. ENV’T L. 177, 185 (2002).
229. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
230. Wynberg, supra note 11, at 409.
231. Blasiak 2019, supra note 218, at 394–95.
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are even capable of providing an effective solution to the problem at
hand. 232

III. Towards an Effective Solution
In using patents to maximize benefits by providing more effective
monitoring of monetary benefits, three hindrances stand in the way of
this goal. These hindrances included the lack of a mandatory DOO
requirement, the exclusion of DSI from the definition of genetic
material, and the overwhelming corporate control of MGR-based
inventions.
Chapter III aims to build on this analysis. First, it will address each
of the three hindrances identified earlier. To develop an efficient, as
well as effective, solution to the problem posed, it is essential to engage
in both a political and academic debate. The subsequent section of this
article brings attention to both the arguments put forth by states at
the BBNJ and proposed solutions within academic discourse. Then, a
novel solution to the problem is proposed—effectively solving the
problem of legal status and equitable distribution.
A.

Mandatory Disclosure of Origin Requirement

As identified in the previous chapter, a mandatory DOO
requirement should be put in place to monitor compliance with the
applicable ABS regime. However, the political opinion surrounding this
issue is split. 233 The user and provider States, generally the Global
North and South respectively, disagree on the inclusion of DOO
requirements for patent applications. 234 Those in favor of including this
requirement, particularly the Global South, argue that it will reduce
the incidence of patents that should not have been granted because the
subject matter lacks novelty or is too obvious. 235 The grant of such
erroneous patents can create barriers preventing access to foreign
markets for products from provider countries. 236 On the other hand,
user countries have resisted a binding agreement or wanted to employ
only defensive measures, such as traditional knowledge databases, to

232. Id.
233. Bonfanti & Trevisanut, supra note 4, at 222–23.
234. Id. at 221–22.
235. World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, ¶ 44, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/27/10 (July 9, 2014).
236. Wallace Feng, Appropriation Without Benefit-Sharing: Origin-ofResource Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement Under TRIPS and
the Nagoya Protocol, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 252 (2017).
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avoid the grant of erroneous patents and the facilitation of ABS.237
They claim that a mandatory genetic resources DOO requirement
would be unworkable as it would reduce legal certainty and place too
much of a burden on patent applicants, resulting in diminished
innovation. 238 The reasoning of countries on either side stems from their
pre-existing national laws. 239
At the international fora, Council for TRIPS and the Conference of
Parties for the CBD discussed these requirements a number of times.240
Recognizing the call for DOO requirements, the WTO Secretariat
considered the suggestion that it should be made a requirement for the
grant of a patent under Article 27.3(b) or Article 29 of TRIPS.241
However, the Secretariat thought that these provisions were not
intended to further the benefit-sharing objective of the CBD, which
instead would be better served by contractual solutions between specific
parties. 242 In the Conference of the Parties VI (“COP-VI”) of the CBD,
Decision VI/24 on Access and Benefit Sharing as Related to Genetic
Resources was adopted, 243 which encouraged the disclosure of the
country of origin per the Bonn Guidelines. 244 However, at the June 2017
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee, it was proposed that the MGRs
found in the ABNJ should be excluded from the mandatory
requirement 245 as an ABS framework under the CBD was yet to be

237. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note
by the Secretariat: The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, ¶ 23, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/368/Rev.1 (Feb. 8, 2006).
238. Blasiak 2019, supra note 218, at 394.
239. See generally Blakeney, Proposals for the International Regulation of
Geographical Indications, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629 (2005).
240. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 237, ¶ 60.
241. Id. ¶ 79.
242. Id. ¶ 144.
243. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention
on
Biological
Diversity,
¶
342,
U.N.
Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (May 27, 2002).
244. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, BONN
GUIDELINES ON ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND FAIR AND
EQUITABLE SHARING OF THE BENEFITS ARISING OUT OF THEIR
UTILIZATION 7 (2002).
245. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. and Genetic Res., Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, 9–10, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/34/4 (Mar.
15, 2017).
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agreed upon. 246 The discussion has not progressed much in the two years
that have followed. 247 The fundamental issue that has led to this
impasse is the question of whether these legal requirements would
enable disclosure as such, or act as an effective prohibition on securing
patents if certain preconditions go unmet. 248
There has been much academic engagement with this fundamental
issue. For example, Feng outlines the legal implications of either
possibility. 249 If the requirements were to enable disclosure, then that
could be pursued under Article 22 and Article 29 of the TRIPS. 250 On
the other hand, if this requirement had to act as an effective
prohibition, then that could be pursued under the Nagoya Protocol
which allows for checkpoints. 251
Conducting a similar analysis, Arnaud-Haond suggests that an
effort from the WTO requiring geographic and taxonomic origin of
resources associated with a patent under TRIPS would help support
the CBD regime, which is not a legally binding instrument. 252 Similarly,
Blakeney proposes that disclosure requirements be included as a
condition of patentability to increase its stringency and thereby the
benefits of the ABS framework. 253 Therefore, there seems to be a
collective consensus within academia that the present legal
requirements of disclosure within the TRIPS can simply be extended to
require the DOO requirements. 254
Given the availability of such a simple legal implication, the lack
of political consensus on the matter indicates that the solution for this
issue does not lie within patent law. As the instrument and any ABS
246. Aysegul Sirakaya, Balanced Options for Access and Benefit-Sharing:
Stakeholder Insights on Provider Country Legislation, 10 FRONTIER
PLANT SCI. 1, 2 (2019).
247. Wend Wendland, “Biopiracy” on the high seas? Countries launch
negotiation towards a new international legally binding instrument on
marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, INTELL.
PROP.
WATCH
(Dec.
14,
2018)
https://www.ipwatch.org/2018/12/14/biopiracy-high-seas-countries-launch-negotiationtowards-new-international-legally-binding-instrument-marine-geneticresources-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction/[https://perma.cc/CD3KU32Q].
248. Feng, supra note 236, at 259–60.
249. See id. at 252–59.
250. TRIPS, supra note 33, at art. 22, 29.
251. Nagoya protocol, supra note 15, at art. 17.
252. Sophie Arnaud-Haond, Marine Biodiversity and Gene Patents, 331
S CIENCE 1521, 1522 (2011).
253. See generally Blakeney, supra note 239.
254. See e.g., id.; Sophie Arnaud-Haond et al., Marine Biodiversity and Gene
Patents, 331 Science 1521 (2011).
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regime it formulates will only be effective if it is signed by user and
provider countries, it is advisable to consider an alternate solution.
B.

Inclusion of Digital Sequence Information

As discussed in Section II, open access DSI is excluded from the
definition of genetic resources under Article 2 of the CBD. 255 It was
noted that including this within the definition would increase the
benefits to the ABS regime because it would require user states to pay
provider states for the resources used. 256 Further, non-monetary benefits
would also increase as DSI contains information that would not
ordinarily be available by making available tangible genetic material.257
However, our understanding of what DSI is still vastly incomplete.
A “Scoping Study” on DSI was conducted in January of 2018 by the
CBD to gather knowledge on what DSI consists of and the concerns it
would trigger if it were included within the convention. 258 At this
nascent stage, there has not been much political engagement on the
matter. 259 So, it would be more appropriate to consult the opinions of
industrial stakeholders.
However, industrial stakeholders are vehemently opposed to the
inclusion of DSI within the Nagoya Protocol. 260 The International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) believes that the availability of DSI
encourages innovation through natural product research, stimulates
scientific collaboration, and promotes publications. 261 Such exchange is
essential to achieve the objectives defined in Article 12 of the CBD,
namely to promote and cooperate in scientific advances, and to develop
programs for scientific and technical education, among others. 262 On a
similar vein, the League of European Universities (“LERU”) argues that
255. See CBD, supra note 8, at art. 2.
256. See generally Jon Ambler et al., Including Digital Sequence Data in the
Nagoya Protocol Can Promote Data Sharing, 39 WORLD TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY (2021); Aysegul Sirakaya, Balanced Options for Access
and Benefit-Sharing: Stakeholder Insights on Provider Country
Legislation, 10 FRONTIERS IN PLANT SCIENCE 1 (2019).
257. See generally Margo Bagley et al., Convention on Biological Diversity,
Fact-finding Study on How Domestic Measures Address Benefit-sharing
Arising from Commercial and Non-commercial Use of Digital Sequence
Information on Genetic Resources and Address the Use of Digital
Sequence Information on Genetic Resources for Research and
Development, U.N. Doc. CBD/DSI/AHTEG/2020/1/5 (Jan. 29, 2020).
258. See WYNBERG & LAIRD, supra note 208.
259. See, e.g., Ambler, supra note 256; Sirakaya, supra note 256.
260. Nohyoung Park, How to Approach the Issue of Digital Sequence
Information: Focusing on the AHTEG, 21 ASIAN BUS. LAW. 15, 25 (2018).
261. ICC Paper, supra note 214, at 2.
262. See CBD, supra note 8, at art. 12.
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requiring the inclusion of DSI will add to the complexity of the Nagoya
Protocol, which is already burdensome for universities. 263 Further,
universities conduct both commercial and non-commercial research; as
the Nagoya Protocol does not make a distinction between the two,264
similar limitations will apply to purely curiosity-driven research and
thus curb innovation.
On the other hand, academics such as Jefferson and Thambisetty
have argued that, by requiring the inclusion of open-access genetic
material, the material would be termed “prior art.” 265 This would then
lead to the failure of fulfilling the novelty requirement of
patentability. 266 Therefore, such material would be easily patentable by
others such as corporate entities. Without the protection of DSI being
treated as genetic resources under the Nagoya Protocol, there is a very
real possibility that it will end up in corporate control. 267
Although the corporate control of such DSI is worrisome, the valid
and vehement opposition to its inclusion within the Nagoya Protocol
by stakeholders demonstrates that regulation of open-access patents is
not the solution.
C.

Overwhelming Corporate Control

The overwhelming corporate control of inventions derived from
MGRs was unearthed by a study from Blasiak in 2017. 268 Further, as
discussed above, publicly available databases have led academics to fear
that corporate entities could patent this open access data. 269

263. LEAGUE OF EUROPEAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES, INCLUSION OF
DIGITAL SEQUENCE INFORMATION IN THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL WOULD
SIGNIFICANTLY
IMPEDE
UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH
5
(2018)
https://www.leru.org/files/LERU-Nagoya-Statement-November2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF9W-LQB8].
264. See generally Nagoya Protocol, supra note 15.
265. Osmat Jefferson et al. Public Disclosure of Biological Sequences in Global
Patent Practice’ 2015 World Patent Information, 43 WORLD PATENT
INFORMATION 12, 16 (2015); see also Thambisetty, Marine Genetic
Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions, supra note 120, at 8.
266. Jefferson et al. supra note 265, at 21–22.
267. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions,
supra note 120, at 6.
268. See generally Blasiak et al., supra note 19; see also ROBERT BLASIAK
ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MARINE FISHERIES:
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOP GLOBAL INDEX
OF VULNERABILITY (2017).
269. See generally Jefferson et al. supra note 265; Thambisetty, Marine Genetic
Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions, supra note 120, at 6.
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An interesting point put forth by Thambisetty is that corporations
tend to have low thresholds for legal uncertainty. 270 Legal rights to
MGRs within the ABNJ tend to be far more certain as they remain
unregulated by the Nagoya Protocol. 271 This certainty makes these
resources far more viable avenues of investment to corporations. 272
If this led to the grant of many patents, as it is likely to, it will
amount to the fragmentation of rights and the private appropriation of
an area that is to be treated as CHM. Even if the CHM principle does
not apply to these resources, academics believe that appropriation must
still be avoided. 273 The fragmentation of rights could lead to the
“tragedy of the anti-commons” or patent thickets where the private
appropriation of biotechnological genes could lead to the
underutilization of the resources. 274 This could hinder innovation rather
than promote it. 275 Moreover, scientific innovations developed from
these patented genetic material will almost certainly be inaccessible to
poorer populations. For this reason privately owned patents on genetic
material and information is not compatible with the idea of good
governance of MGR from ABNJ nor is it in the best interests of all
mankind.
Given the numerous incentives for patents on genetic resources,276
and the limited number of entities who have the capacity to prospect
on the high seas, 277 this is a problem that needs to be resolved urgently.
However, due to the exclusive rights granted by patents, 278 it might be
wise to consider an alternative approach to reach a timely and viable
solution.
Therefore, none of the three hindrances to the achievement of
framing an efficient ABS regime can be effectively overcome through
270. Thambisetty, Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National Jurisdictions,
supra note 120, at 9.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 6.
273. Correa, supra note 193, at 2.
274. Michael Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998).
275. Louise de la Fayette, A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable
Use of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 221, 278
(2009).
276. See e.g., Itsuki Shimbo et al., Patent Protection and Access to Genetic
Resources, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 645 (2008).
277. Id. at 646.
278. General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics#heading-1
[https://perma.cc/9699-QGYV].
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the patent system. Although academics agree that the imposition of a
mandatory DOO requirement would naturally extend from the existing
disclosure requirements, there is a lack of political consensus in this
regard. 279 Second, regarding the inclusion of DSI within the Nagoya
Protocol, this would lead to the realization of greater benefits by
requiring users to pay providers for access to information. But
stakeholders are opposed to this proposal because it would increase legal
uncertainty and create a more tedious ABS regime. 280 Finally, the very
nature of patents gives rise to the issue of overwhelming corporate
control. Keeping this in mind, in the final section of this paper I propose
a possible alternative solution.
D. Alternative Solution

Although patents may be able to maximize or monitor monetary
benefits, they may not be the most effective solution given the lack of
political and stakeholder consensus. Academics agree that, regardless of
MGRs within ABNJ being classified as CHM, the area constitutes a
public domain whose management can only be considered effective
when not privately appropriated by any one party. 281 “Rather, the
system should be based on cooperative actions and accessibility to the
outcomes of innovation.” 282
One thing that the solutions above failed to consider is the political
tensions and what the most realistic option would be. The deadlocks
identified in Chapter II will not effectively be solved by the solutions
analyzed in Section III because States, who have been identified as the
main stakeholders at the BBNJ, 283 will still negotiate with their vested
interests in mind. These must be considered alongside free-market
principles so that the 1994 Implementation Agreement
(“Implementation Agreement”) is signed by developing as well as

279. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 124, 124–
25 (2004).
280. See generally Elizabeth J. Karger & Amber Hartman Scholz, DSI, the
Nagoya Protocol, and Stakeholders’ Concerns, 29 TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 110 (2021).
281. See e.g., Shimbo et al., supra note 276, at 645.
282. Carlos Correa, supra note 193, at 20.
283. See generally Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally
Binding Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological
Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.232/3019/1 (Dec. 3, 2018).
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developed states. If not, then a similar situation that brought the
Implementation Agreement will be reached. 284
However, an emerging new method of management of the public
domain has recently emerged with free market principles at its heart.285
This is the principle termed “nondominium” 286 and it requires due
consideration as an effective alternative solution.
1.

Application of Nondominium to ABNJ

Nondominium was coined by Chris Cook as a concept much like
regional stewardship or trusteeship. 287 As a principle, nondominium is
an agreement which brings the stakeholders together—either jointly or
collectively—to hold land in common, but also enables them severally
and individually to share the rights and obligations as they may
consensually agree. 288 It places economic development at its heart. 289
Simply put, the user of the land pays a rental in money or kind and
a proportion of this flow of value is allocated to a group of stakeholders
that introduce the occupiers and investors, among other things, as a
service. 290 In designing the regime, the stakeholder’s interests are in line
with that of any investors who participate within the system. 291 The
stakeholders are not themselves entitled to any dominant rights;
however, they possess certain veto rights within the agreement.292
Essentially this results in “a cooperative of cooperatives,” in the words
of Cook. 293 Although the occupier, investor and manager can all change,
the land in itself can never be bought or sold and will remain in
perpetuity as a nondominium. 294

284. Brown, ‘Neither Necessary nor Prudent at this Stage’: The Regime of
Seabed Mining and its Impact on the Universality of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 17 MARINE POL’Y 2, 81, 82 (1993).
285. Mandeep Bhandal, Submission by Chris Cook to the Land Reform
Review Group, RESILIBLOG,
https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/resilience/2013/01/16/submission-by-chris-cookto-the-land-reform-review-group/ [https://perma.cc/LKM4-DZV9].
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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This principle was applied to the ocean and its resources by Laister
and Faizer. 295 According to Laister and Faizer, a trustee for the CHM
would represent a group of beneficiaries and oversee the legal operation
of the common area. 296 Meanwhile, a manager would also be appointed,
to help them identify opportunities for advancement of the common
pool of resources per a transparent formula for revenue sharing. Each
representative has the right to veto a resource development proposal
put forth.
When a formula is agreed upon, recognizing the needed inputs and
the overall revenue sharing, the manager will arrange to open tenders
to make potential investors and occupiers meet. This solution will
ensure the maximizing of the economic value of the MGRs within the
ABNJ. All the while, such tenders would remain neutral with no
nationality or domicile and the revenue from ensuing activities would
be distributed on a previously agreed basis. The manager also handles
those who are noncompliant. This allows for an efficient dispute
resolution process. In this manner, this framework as set out by the
nondominium principle conforms to the international law requirements
that no country or political groups could dominate. 297
2.

Benefits over Current Regime

The legal framework considered by this paper so far dealt with
creation of an ABS framework regarding the patent system. Thus, this
paper only considers the maximizing of the economic value and the
incentivizing of innovation.
The inventions derived from MGRs can be commissioned through
tenders. To create greater economic value, this approach would help
provide incentives at an earlier stage of the bioprospecting process as
users pay rent and investors would be privy to the terms agreed upon.
Further, this approach aids the advancement of science and the
common resources while also incentivizing innovations. It allows the
beneficiaries to enlist the help of technologically advanced countries to
create an invention for which a need was felt. In doing so, it does not
tie up genetic material upstream as the tenders remain neutral and
benefits accrued will be shared in a previously agreed manner. This
could be an effective way to deal with the problem of overwhelming
295. Valnora Leister & Mark Frazier, From Local to Global Commons:
Applying Ostrom’s Key Principles for Sustainable Governance, EARTH
SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 18,
http://www.earthsystemgovernance.org/lund2012/LC2012-paper94.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WF5U-Q92E].
296. Id.
297. See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal
Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 370 (2005).
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corporate control over patents. Rather than create exclusive rights,
corporations would be able to negotiate the benefit-sharing mechanism.
Further, it could be argued that the debates surrounding the DOO
and DSI requirements, which had come to a standstill due to clashing
interests of state parties, 298 could now move forward. The DOO
requirement will no longer be an issue as the vested interests of the
States will have to be negotiated between the concerned parties at the
time of the conclusion of the tender. Similarly, regarding the DSI
requirement, the added complexity and uncertainty surrounding the
already burdensome Nagoya Protocol 299 will no longer exist.
Therefore, the nondominium principle could potentially pave the
way to incentivize user countries to innovate without private
appropriation of rights through patents. Further, it also helps maximize
economic value and share the resources in an equitable manner. Finally,
the nondominium principle formulates an effective and probable
solution as it considers the existing political and stakeholder conflicts.300

IV. Conclusion
With advancement in technology, the context surrounding the
UNCLOS, the CBD and the TRIPS has changed. Sections I and II
identified the regulatory gap caused by the bioprospecting of MGRs
within ABNJ. Moreover, when significant contextual transformations
take place, new norms emerge, old norms expire, and their
interpretations shift. Discussing the uncertainty surrounding the legal
status of the MGRs within the ABNJ in Section I, taking a normative
approach to the application of Article 31 of the VCLT, it is possible
that the old interpretation could be shifted to cover the gap in the law
and thus achieve the objectives of the development agenda.
Section III addressed the regulatory gap within the CBD and the
possible relationship between the TRIPS and the CBD. The
patentability of genetic material was briefly considered, and the
importance of human intervention was emphasized. Then, the chapter
continued by discussing three hindrances when linking the patent
system to the ABS framework. These hindrances were the lack of a
mandatory DOO requirement, the exclusion of DSI from the definition
of genetic material, and the overwhelming corporate control of MGRbased inventions. Discussing the political and academic misgivings to
these three hindrances, Chapter III identified the deadlock that the
discussions reached regarding each of these points. Although academics
agreed that the imposition of a mandatory DOO requirement would
naturally extend from the existing disclosure requirements, there is a
298. See generally Chiarolla, supra note 212.
299. See Nagoya protocol, supra note 15.
300. Bhandal, supra note 285.
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lack of political consensus. 301 Second, regarding the inclusion of DSI
within the Nagoya Protocol, although this would lead to the realization
of greater benefits by requiring users to pay providers for access to
information, stakeholders are vehemently opposed to this proposal as it
would increase the legal uncertainty and create a more tedious ABS
regime. 302 Finally, the issue of overwhelming corporate control was
caused by the very nature of patents, which grants exclusive rights.303
As it emerged that the solution does not lie within the patent system,
it became clear that the nondominium principle is the most effective
and probable solution.
The nondominium principle would allow for the management of the
public domain while carrying the free market principles at its heart.
This management method would effectively create a solution for the
three hindrances identified above. Moreover, it would propose an
equitable distribution of resources while maximizing economic value for
the countries of the Global North and the South. Most importantly, it
could potentially pave the way to incentivize user countries to innovate
without private appropriation of rights through patent. However, it
remains to be seen whether stakeholders prioritize innovation and
equitable distribution over private appropriation and profit.

301. See e.g., Chiarolla, supra note 212, at 179.
302. See id. at 178.
303. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 278.
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